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U.S. Interim Restraint Policy: Responding to Soviet Arms Control Violations

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Following are texts of the President's statement and a White House fact sheet of May 27, 1986, concerning U.S. interim restraint policy and the U.S. response to Soviet arms control violations.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT

On the eve of the strategic arms reduction talks (START) in 1982, I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] interim offensive agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this action, despite my concerns about the flaws inherent in those agreements, to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiations on arms reductions. I made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup.

Last June, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy. I found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain. As I have documented in three detailed reports to the Congress, most recently in December 1985, the Soviet Union, regrettably, has not. I noted last June that the pattern of Soviet noncompliance with their existing arms control commitments increasingly affected our national security. This pattern also raised fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process itself. A country simply cannot be serious about effective arms control unless it is equally serious about compliance.

In spite of the regrettable Soviet record, I concluded last June that it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try, once more, to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursued, with renewed vigor, our objective of deep reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals through the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go the extra mile, dismantling a Poseidon submarine, U.S.S. *Sam Rayburn*, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their noncompliance, reversing their unwarranted military buildup, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

Later this month, the eighth Trident submarine, U.S.S. *Nevada*, begins sea trials. In accordance with our announced policy, I have assessed our options with respect to that milestone. I have considered Soviet actions since my June 1985 decision and U.S. and allied security interests in light of both those actions and our programmatic options. The situation is not encouraging.

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas, there has been no real progress toward meeting U.S. concerns with respect to the general pattern of Soviet noncompliance with major arms control commitments, particularly in those areas of most obvious and direct Soviet noncompliance with the SALT and ABM [antiballistic missile] agreements. The deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) type, continues apace. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing in a manner which impedes verification. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force buildup. Finally, since the November summit, we have yet to see the Soviets follow up constructively on the commitment made by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).

Based on Soviet conduct since my June 1985 decision, I can only conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate its readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. At

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the same time, I have also considered the programmatic options available to the United States in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and allied security.

When I issued guidance on U.S. policy on June 10, 1985, the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near term for altering its planning is modest at best. Our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face. These budgetary conditions make it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

The United States had long planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest Poseidon submarines when their reactor cores were exhausted. Had I been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two Poseidon submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, I would have directed that these two Poseidon submarines not be dismantled but be overhauled and retained. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities, I have directed their retirement and dismantlement as planned.

As part of the same decision last June, I also announced that we would take appropriate and proportionate responses when needed to protect our own security in the face of continuing Soviet noncompliance. It is my view that certain steps are now required by continued Soviet disregard of their obligations.

Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet noncompliance remains the implementation of our full strategic modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our allies. The strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive force options. It provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one.

It is absolutely essential that we maintain full support for these programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet noncompliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their noncompliance. And it would significantly increase the risk to our security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must remain the full implementation of these programs.

Secondly, the development by the Soviet Union of its massive ICBM forces continues to challenge seriously the essential balance which has deterred both conflict and coercion. Last June, I cited the Soviet Union's SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under SALT II, as a clear and irreversible violation. With the number of deployed SS-25 mobile ICBMs growing, I now call upon the Congress to restore bipartisan support for a balanced, cost-effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of the U.S. ICBM program. This program should include the full deployment of the 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs. But it must also look beyond the Peacekeeper and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future, including the small ICBM to complement Peacekeeper. Therefore, I have directed the Department of Defense to provide to me by November 1986 an assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program. This assessment will address the basing of the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles and specific alternative configurations for the small ICBM in terms of size, number of warheads, and production rates.

Finally, I have also directed that the advanced cruise missile program be accelerated. This would not direct any increase in the total program procurement at this time but rather would establish a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

This brings us to the question of the SALT agreements. SALT II was a fundamentally flawed and unratified treaty. Even if ratified, it would have expired on December 31, 1985. When presented to the U.S. Senate in 1979, it was considered by a broad range of critics, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in important provisions. It was, therefore, judged by many to be inimical to genuine arms control, to the security interests of the United States and its allies, and to global stability. The proposed treaty was clearly headed for defeat before my predecessor asked the Senate not to act on it.

The most basic problem with SALT II was that it codified major arms buildups rather than reductions. For example, even though at the time the treaty was signed in 1979, the United States had, and only planned for, 550 MIRVed [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle] ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union possessed only about 600, SALT II permitted each side to increase the number of such launchers to 820. It also permitted a buildup to 1,200 MIRVed ballistic launchers (both ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles) even though the United States had only about 1,050 and the Soviet Union had only about 750 when the treaty was signed. It permitted the Soviet Union to retain all of its heavy ballistic missiles. Finally, it limited ballistic missile launchers, not the missiles or the warheads carried by the ballistic missiles. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of each of the 820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits and from about 5,000 to over 9,000 warheads today. What is worse, given the failure of SALT II to constrain ballistic missile warheads, the number of warheads on Soviet ballistic missiles will continue to grow very significantly, even under the treaty's limits, in the continued absence of Soviet restraint.

In 1982, on the eve of the START negotiations, I undertook not to undercut existing arms control agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union demonstrated comparable restraint. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union did not exercise comparable restraint, and uncorrected Soviet violations have seriously undermined the SALT structure. Last June, I once again laid out our legitimate concerns but decided to go the extra mile, dismantling a Poseidon submarine, not to comply with or abide by a flawed and unratified treaty but rather to give the Soviet Union one more chance and adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. The Soviet Union has not used the past year for this purpose.

Given this situation, I have determined that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on stan-

dards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

Since the United States will retire and dismantle two Poseidon submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty until the United States equips its 131st heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that I have been forced to make, I intend at that time to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Of course, since we will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II Treaty for some months, I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account.

The United States seeks to meet its strategic needs, given the Soviet build-up, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task which faces us. I call on the Soviet Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in establishing an interim framework of truly *mutual* restraint.

Finally, I want to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim INF agreement. If the Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve greater stability and a safer world.

FACT SHEET

Summary

The United States has completed a comprehensive review of its interim restraint policy and of the required response to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. Based on this review, and following consultations with the Congress and key allies, we have been forced to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate a readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly *mutual* restraint.

Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, the President has decided that in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT II agreement of 1979 or the SALT I interim offensive agreement of 1972. SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I interim offensive agreement of 1972 was unequal, has expired, and is also being violated by the Soviet Union.

After reviewing the programmatic options available to the United States, the President has decided to retire and dismantle two older Poseidon submarines this summer. The United States will thus remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II agreement until we equip our 131st heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. The President has determined that, given the decision that he has been forced to make by lack of Soviet reciprocity, the United States will later this year continue deployment of B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II agreement.

The President has also called for: renewed bipartisan support for the Administration's full strategic modernization program including all 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs; full funding of our research under the Strategic Defense Initiative; an assessment of options on future ICBM programs, including Peacekeeper basing and the small ICBM; and acceleration of the advanced cruise missile (ACM) program.

The President has determined that, in carrying out this policy, the United States will continue to exercise utmost restraint. We will seek to meet our strategic needs by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. We do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in the number of U.S. strategic offensive forces. Furthermore, the President has emphasized that, assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the needed strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

The President indicated that since the United States will remain in technical observance with the terms of the expired SALT II agreement for some months, the Soviet Union will have even more time to change the conditions that now exist. The President hopes that the Soviet Union will use this time constructively; if they do, the United States will certainly take this into account. (Concerning the SALT I agreement, even without any U.S. retirement of older systems, the United States could remain in technical observance of its terms for several years until the 10th Trident submarine begins sea trials in mid-1989.)

Finally, the President has reiterated that his highest priority in the nuclear arms control area is to obtain Soviet agreement to a new and more durable arms control framework—one built upon deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in the offensive nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. He, therefore, calls upon the Soviet Union to carry out in the ongoing Geneva negotiations the agreement which he and General Secretary Gorbachev reached at the November summit, calling for 50% reductions, appropriately applied, in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and an interim agreement on intermediate nuclear forces. If Moscow instructs its negotiators to ap-

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ply themselves seriously and flexibly toward these goals, as the U.S. negotiators are prepared to do, we can move together now to build a safer and more stable world.

Introduction

Over the past 2½ years, the President has sent three reports to the Congress detailing the serious realities of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, including major agreements on strategic arms. The United States has unsuccessfully pressed the Soviet Union in the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and through other diplomatic channels to resolve our concerns.

In spite of this pattern of Soviet noncompliance, the President decided last June to go the extra mile in dismantling a U.S. Poseidon submarine, U.S.S. *Sam Rayburn*, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the opportunity to join the United States in an interim framework of truly *mutual* restraint on strategic offensive arms. He stated that such a framework required that the Soviets correct their noncompliance, reverse their unwarranted military buildup, and make progress at the Geneva negotiations. In addition, he indicated that the United States, which has scrupulously complied with its arms control obligations and commitments, would be required to develop appropriate and proportionate responses to assure U.S. and allied security in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance. He directed that all programmatic responses be kept open, and he requested specific programmatic recommendations of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In recent months, the President has reviewed these issues in great detail with his senior advisers and has consulted extensively with Members of Congress and allied leaders. He announced his decision in the statement issued today. This fact sheet reports on the President's decision.

Background

1982 Decision. In 1982, on the eve of the strategic arms reduction talks, the President decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite his serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, he took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint on force deployments conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START. He made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup. The Soviet Union also made a policy commitment not to undercut these agreements.

1985 Decision. In a decision reported to the Congress on June 10, 1985, the President reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy concerning strategic agreements in light of the continuing pattern of the Soviet Union's noncompliance with its arms control obligations and commitments. He found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain and had scrupulously complied with the terms of its obligations and commitments.

By contrast, he noted with regret that the Soviet Union had repeatedly violated several of its major arms control obligations and commitments. His three reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance in January 1984, February 1985, and December 1985 enumerate and document in detail the serious facts and U.S. concerns about Soviet violations. The overall judgment reached by the President in his June 1985 decision was that while the Soviets had observed some provisions of existing arms control agreements, they had violated important elements of those agreements and associated legal obligations and political commitments.

The President noted that these are very crucial issues, for to be serious about effective arms control is to be serious about compliance. The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly affects our national security. But, perhaps even more significant than the near-term military consequences of the violations themselves, they raise fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process, concerns that, if uncorrected, undercut the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world.

The President also noted that the United States had repeatedly raised our serious concerns with the Soviet Union in diplomatic channels, including the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission. His assessment was that, despite long and repeated U.S. efforts to resolve these issues, the Soviet Union had neither provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective action. Instead, Soviet violations had expanded as the Soviets continued to modernize their strategic forces. U.S. interim restraint policy has always been conditioned on Soviet reciprocity. In his June assessment, the President was consequently forced to conclude that the Soviet Union was not exercising the equal restraint upon which U.S. interim restraint policy had been conditioned, that we could not accept a double standard of unilateral U.S. compliance coupled with Soviet noncompliance, and that such Soviet behavior was fundamentally inimical to the future of arms control and to the security of our country and that of our allies.

At the same time, given the goal of reducing the size of Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals, the President made the judgment that it remained in the interest of the United States to go the extra mile in seeking to persuade the Soviet Union to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly *mutual* restraint on strategic offensive arms, as we pursued with renewed vigor, through the negotiations in Geneva, our goal of deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

The President made clear, however, that the United States could not establish such a framework alone. Movement toward an acceptable framework required the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and reverse or substantially reduce its unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup. Although the Soviet Union had not demonstrated a willingness to move in this direction, the President announced that in the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, he was prepared to go the extra mile.

The President thus decided last June that to provide the Soviets a further opportunity to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint which could support ongoing negotiations, the United States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursued arms reductions agreements in the nuclear and space talks in Geneva. Further, he stated that the United States would constantly review the implications of this interim policy on the long-term security interests of the United States and its allies. He indicated that, in doing so, the United States would consider Soviet actions to resolve our concerns with the pattern of Soviet noncompliance, continued growth in the strategic

force structure of the Soviet Union, and Soviet seriousness in the ongoing negotiations.

As an integral part of the implementation of this policy, the President announced that the United States would take those steps made necessary by Soviet noncompliance to assure U.S. national security and that of our allies. He noted that appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to make it perfectly clear to Moscow that violations of arms control arrangements entail real costs. He stated clearly that the United States would, therefore, develop appropriate and proportionate responses and would take those actions necessary in response to, and as a hedge against, the military consequences of uncorrected Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements.

The President decided last June that to provide still more time for the Soviet Union to demonstrate by its action a commitment to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the United States would deactivate and dismantle, according to agreed procedures, an existing older Poseidon submarine as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class Trident submarine put to sea in August 1985. However, the President also directed that the United States keep open all future programmatic options for handling such strategic deployment milestones as they occurred in the future. He made it clear that, as these later milestones were reached, he would assess the overall situation and make a final determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet actions in meeting the criteria which he cited.

U.S. Compliance

In accordance with U.S. interim restraint policy and our efforts to build an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the United States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing agreements. We have continued scrupulously to live within all arms control agreements, including the SALT I and II agreements. For example, we have fully dismantled one Poseidon and eight Polaris missile-carrying submarines and 27 Titan II ICBM launchers as new Trident missile-carrying submarines have been deployed. Unfortunately, while the United States has been attempting to hold to the structure of SALT through our policy of interim restraint, the Soviet Union, through its continued noncompliance, has undermined the very foundation of that structure.

Soviet Noncompliance

In the most recent of his three reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, issued on December 23, 1985, the President confirmed that the Administration's continuing studies supported the conclusion that the pattern of Soviet noncompliance continues largely uncorrected. As documented in the President's reports, particularly the detailed classified versions, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligations under, or political commitments to, the SALT II agreement of 1979, the SALT I interim offensive agreement of 1972, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, the Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons of 1925, and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. In addition, the U.S.S.R. has likely violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974.

In his December 1985 report to the Congress, the President noted that through its noncompliance with arms control agreements, the Soviet Union has made military gains in the areas of strategic offensive arms as well as chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. The President added that in the area of strategic defense, the possible extent of the Soviet Union's military gains by virtue of its noncompliance with the ABM Treaty is also of increasing importance and serious concern to the United States.

The President noted in his December report that in a fundamental sense all deliberate Soviet violations are equally important. He made clear that as violations of legal obligations or political commitments, they cause grave concern regarding Soviet commitment to arms control and darken the atmosphere in which current negotiations are being conducted in Geneva and elsewhere.

In another sense, the President noted, Soviet violations are not of equal importance. Some Soviet violations are of significant military importance—like the illegal second type of new ICBM, telemetry encryption, and the Krasnoyarsk radar. While other violations are of little apparent military significance in their own right, such violations can acquire importance if, left unaddressed, they are permitted to become precedents for future, more threatening violations. Moreover, some Soviet actions that individually have little military significance could conceivably become significant when taken in their aggregate. Finally, even if a specific violation does not contain an inherent military threat, it still undermines the viability and integrity of the arms control process.

Specific Soviet Violations

Concerning SALT II, the President's December report, in addition to citing the Soviets' SS-25 ICBM development and extensive encryption of telemetry on ICBM missile flight tests as violations, also enumerated additional clear Soviet violations of SALT II, including exceeding the numerical limit of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and concealment of the association between the SS-25 missile and its launcher. In addition, the President's report cited three areas of ambiguous Soviet behavior as involving possible violations or inconsistencies with regard to SALT II—SS-16 ICBM activity, the Backfire bomber's intercontinental operating capability, and the Backfire bomber's production rate.

Concerning the SALT I interim offensive agreement of 1972, the President's December 1985 report cited a violation in Soviet use of former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS-25 mobile ICBMs.

Concerning the ABM Treaty of 1972, the President's December 1985 report indicated that in addition to illegal construction of the ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk, the combination of other Soviet ABM-related activities involving mobility of ABM system components, concurrent testing, rapid reload, etc., also suggested that the Soviets might be preparing an ABM defense of their national territory, which is prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Such an action, if left without a U.S. response, would have serious adverse consequences for the East-West balance that has kept the peace.

Three key Soviet violations of strategic arms agreements enumerated below are particularly disturbing—the SS-25 ICBM, encryption of telemetry, and the Krasnoyarsk radar.

- *SALT II: SS-25 ICBM.* The President stated in his December 1985 report that the SS-25 mobile ICBM is a clear and irreversible violation of the Soviet Union's SALT II commitment and has important political and military implications. Testing and deployment of this missile violates a central provision of the SALT II agreement, which was intended to limit the number of new ICBMs. The agreement permits only one new type of ICBM for each party. The Soviets have informed us that their

one new ICBM type will be the SS-X-24, which is now undergoing testing, and have falsely asserted that the SS-25 is a permitted modernization of their old silo-based SS-13 ICBM. The President also concluded that the technical argument by which the Soviets sought to justify the SS-25, calling it "permitted modernization," is also troublesome as a potential precedent, as the Soviets might seek to apply it to additional prohibited new types of ICBMs in the future.

• *SALT II: Telemetry Encryption.* The President stated in his December report that Soviet use of encryption impedes U.S. verification of Soviet compliance and thus contravenes the provision of the SALT II Treaty which prohibits use of deliberate concealment measures, including encryption, which impede verification of compliance by national technical means. This deliberate Soviet concealment activity, he explained, impedes our ability to know whether a type of missile is in compliance with SALT II requirements. It could also make it more difficult for the United States to assess accurately the critical parameters of any future missile.

Since the SALT I agreement of 1972, the President reported, Soviet encryption practices have become more extensive and disturbing. The President noted that these Soviet practices, Soviet responses on this issue, and Soviet failure to take corrective actions which the United States has repeatedly requested, demonstrate a Soviet attitude contrary to the fundamentals of sound arms control agreements, undermine the political confidence necessary for concluding new agreements, and underscore the necessity that any new agreement be effectively verifiable.

• *ABM Treaty: Krasnoyarsk Radar.* The President stated in his December 1985 report that the radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is disturbing for both political and military reasons. First, it violates the 1972 ABM Treaty, which prohibits the siting of an ABM radar, or the siting and orienting of a ballistic missile detection and tracking radar, in the way the Krasnoyarsk radar is sited and oriented. Politically, he said, the radar demonstrates that the Soviets are capable of violating arms control obligations and commitments even when they are negotiating with the United States or when they know we will detect a violation.

Militarily, he noted, the Krasnoyarsk radar violation goes to the heart of the ABM Treaty. Large phased-array radars (LPARs), like that under construction near Krasnoyarsk, were recognized during the ABM Treaty negotiations as the critical, long lead-time element of a nationwide ABM defense.

When considered as a part of a Soviet network of new LPARs, the President concluded, the Krasnoyarsk radar has the inherent potential to contribute to ABM radar coverage of a significant portion of the central U.S.S.R. Moreover, the Krasnoyarsk radar closes the remaining gap in Soviet ballistic missile detection and tracking coverage. Together with other Soviet ABM-related activities, it suggests, as noted above, that the Soviets might be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory, which is prohibited by the treaty and would have serious adverse consequences for the East-West balance that has kept the peace.

The Current U.S. Deployment Milestone

On May 28, the eighth U.S. Trident submarine, U.S.S. *Nevada*, begins its sea trials. As called for by the U.S. interim restraint policy announced last June, the President has carefully assessed our options with respect to that milestone. He has considered Soviet behavior since his June 1985 decision to go the extra mile, and he has considered U.S. and allied security interests in light of that Soviet behavior and our own programmatic options.

Since the President made his decision in June 1985 to dismantle a Poseidon, U.S.S. *Sam Rayburn*, in order to give the Soviets adequate time to join us in establishing a truly mutual framework of interim restraint, the situation has not been encouraging with respect to the three criteria that the President established for gauging constructive Soviet action—i.e., 1) correction of Soviet noncompliance, 2) reversal of the Soviet military buildup, and 3) promoting progress in the Geneva negotiations.

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas of U.S. concern—for example, with respect to the production rate of Backfire bombers—there has been no real progress by the Soviets in meeting the most serious U.S. concerns. The deployment of the SS-25, a second new ICBM type forbidden by SALT II, continues. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing and impedes SALT II verification. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force buildup. Finally, after a hopeful meeting in Geneva last November between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, we have yet to see the Soviet Union follow up in negotiations on the commitment made in the joint statement issued by the two leaders to seek common ground, especially through the principle of 50% strategic arms reductions, appropriately applied, and through an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces. In light of these circumstances, it is the President's judgment that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate by deed its readiness to join us in a framework of truly *mutual* interim restraint.

As the President has considered options associated with the current deployment milestone with the sea trials of the eighth Trident, he has also carefully reviewed the military programmatic options available to the United States in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and allied security. It should be noted in this context that when the President issued guidance on U.S. policy in June of last year, the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near term for altering its planning is modest at best, and our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions. This shadow lengthens and darkens with each reduction made in the funds available for our defense. Operating under such a shadow, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face, makes it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

It had long been planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest Poseidon submarines. The President indicated in the decision announced today that had he been persuaded that refueling and retaining these particular two Poseidon submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, he would have directed their overhaul and retention. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities, it is the President's judgment that, at this particular juncture, the proper course with respect to these two older Poseidon submarines is to retire and dismantle them, according to agreed procedures.

Proportionate U.S. Responses

In announcing his decision last June, the President made clear at the same time that the United States would take ap-

propriate and proportionate actions when needed to assure U.S. and allied security in the face of Soviet noncompliance. It is the President's view that, while two Poseidon submarines should be dismantled for military and economic reasons, certain new programmatic U.S. steps focused on the Administration's strategic modernization program are now necessitated by the continued lack of Soviet action up to this point in meeting the criteria established by the President's interim restraint policy decision last June.

Strategic Modernization Program. The Administration's highest priority in the strategic programs area remains the full implementation of the U.S. strategic modernization program to underwrite deterrence today and the full pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative research program to seek to provide better alternatives in the future. The President's decision to retire the two older Poseidon submarines at this point is fully in accordance with that program. Under any set of assumptions, our modernization program is, and will always be, designed to guarantee that our nation always has modern forces in sufficient quantities to underwrite our security and that of our allies—nothing more and nothing less. This goal ensures that the appropriate, best, and proper use is made of our national resources.

The U.S. strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles to the full program of 100 missiles, which was called for in 1983 by the Scowcroft commission, is fully supported by our military leadership. The Administration's full strategic modernization program has been very carefully crafted by our best defense planners. It is the foundation for all future U.S. strategic program options and provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The President believes it is absolutely critical that this program not be permitted to erode. That would be the worst way to respond to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance, would increase the risk to our security and that of our allies, and would undercut our ability to negotiate the reductions in existing arsenals that we seek. It, therefore, would send precisely the wrong signal to the Soviet leadership.

• *Bipartisan Support for the U.S. ICBM Program.* Soviet actions to continue the accelerated development of their ICBM force are of great concern. Last June, the President cited the Soviet Union's flight-testing of the SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under the SALT II agreement, as a clear and irreversible violation and noted that deployment would constitute a further violation. He noted that since the noncompliance associated with the development of this missile cannot, at this point, be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States reserved the right to respond proportionately and appropriately. At that time, he also noted that the U.S. small ICBM program was particularly relevant in this regard. Given the events that have occurred since last June, including the Soviet Union's deployment of over 70 SS-25 mobile ICBMs, the President calls upon the Congress to join with him in restoring bipartisan support for a balanced, cost-effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of our own ICBM program.

• *Peacekeeper (MX).* The program we require should include the full 100-missile deployment of the Peacekeeper ICBM. It is sometimes forgotten by critics of the Administration's 100-missile Peacekeeper program that this represents a number only one-half that requested by the previous Administration. The Peacekeeper missile has just completed another flawless flight test. It makes both good military and economic sense fully to exploit the great technical success that we have had with this missile.

• *Small ICBM.* The President believes that our ICBM program must also look beyond the Peacekeeper and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future. Our small ICBM program makes a significant contribution not only in this regard but also as an appropriate and proportionate U.S. response to the irreversible Soviet violation associated with their SS-25 mobile ICBM.

• *A Comprehensive Program.* To ensure that he has a more robust range of options as he approaches future milestones, the President has, in the decision announced today, directed the Department of Defense to provide to him by November 1986 an assessment of the best options for carrying out a comprehensive ICBM program.

• *Advanced Cruise Missile.* Finally, the President has also directed the Secretary of Defense to take the steps necessary, working with the Congress, to accelerate the production of the advanced cruise missile (ACM) program. The President is not, at this time, directing any increase in the total ACM program procurement but rather is establishing a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

The U.S. and SALT

Having completed a comprehensive review of U.S. interim restraint policy and of the required response to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, and following consultations with the Congress and key allies, the President has been forced to conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate a readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, the President has decided that in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT II agreement of 1979 or the SALT I interim offensive agreement of 1972. SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I interim offensive agreement of 1972 was unequal, has expired, and is also being violated by the Soviet Union.

After reviewing the programmatic options available to the United States, the President has decided to retire and dismantle two older Poseidon submarines this summer. The United States will thus remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II agreement until we equip our 131st heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. The President has determined that, given the decision that he has been forced to make by lack of Soviet reciprocity, the United States will later this year continue deployment of B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II agreement.

Continued U.S. Restraint

The President emphasized that the United States will continue to seek to meet its strategic needs, in response to the Soviet buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The President pointed out that, as the United States

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modernizes, it will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. Therefore, he does not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. The President also emphasized that, assuming no significant change in the threat that we face, as we implement the needed strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

Since the United States will retire and dismantle two Poseidon submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II agreement until the United States equips its 131st heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that the President has been forced to make, he announced today that, at that time, he intends to continue deployment of U.S. B–52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II agreement. Of course, since the United States will remain in technical observance of the terms of the expired SALT II agreement for some months, the President continues to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, the President noted that the United States will certainly take this into account.

In sum, the United States will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while ensuring the credibility of our strategic deterrent, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task that faces us.

The ABM Treaty

Our obligations under the ABM Treaty remain unchanged. The President has made it clear that U.S. programs are, and will continue to be, in compliance with our obligations under the ABM Treaty. The President's statement today also makes it clear that we remain deeply concerned over Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty. In contrast with SALT I and SALT II, however, the ABM Treaty is not an expired or unratified agreement. One of our priority objectives remains to have the Soviet Union return to compliance with their obligations under this treaty.

Hope for Progress in Geneva Negotiations

Time has not altered the basic truth that a policy of interim restraint is not a substitute for an agreement on deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, our highest priority.

It, therefore, remains our hope that the Soviet Union will take the necessary steps to give substance to the agreement which President Reagan reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to negotiate 50% reductions in strategic nuclear arms, appropriately applied, and an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear arms. If the Soviets agree to take those steps with us, we can together achieve greater stability and a safer world.■

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